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Price reduction as a consumer sales remedy and the powers of
national courts: Duarte Hueros
Case C-32/12, Soledad Duarte Hueros v. Autociba SA, Automóviles Citroën
España SA, Judgment of the Court of Justice (First Chamber) of 3 October
2013, nyr.
1. Introduction
This case is interesting for a number of reasons. First, this is only the third time
the Court of Justice has addressed the Consumer Sales Directive (hereafter:
“CSD”) in a preliminary reference procedure.1 However, the preliminary
question under review is not about substantive law, but rather about procedural
aspects. Indeed, it focuses on an often discussed theme: the power (or the duty)
of national courts to apply ex officio European law or national provisions
implementing European law.2 The second is that the ex officio application of
pleas is applied for the first time to national law transposing the Consumer
Sales Directive. The specific question treated in the case is whether the CSD
precludes national legislation which does not allow a court to grant of its own
motion a price reduction when the consumer only invoked rescission of the
contract, which could not be granted, in the specific circumstances that the
consumer is not entitled to refine its original application or to bring a fresh
action.
1. Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25May 1999 on
certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, O.J. 1999, L
171/12–16 (hereinafter: “CSD”). For the two previous cases, see Case C-404/06, Quelle AG v.
Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände, [2008] ECR I-2685;
Joined cases C-65 & 87/09,Gebr.WeberGmbH v. Jürgen Wittmer and Ingrid Putz v.Medianess
Electronics GmbH, [2011] ECR I-5257.
2. It should be noted that directives cannot of themselves impose obligations on individuals
(Case C-91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl., [1994] ECR I-3325). Consequently, in
procedures between private parties the national judge will only be obliged or have the power to
apply of its own motion the national provisions implementing the specific directive. See
Trstenjak and Beysen, “European consumer protection law: curia semper dabit remedium?”, 48
CML Rev. (2011), 122. Cf. also Stuyck, case note on Océano Grupo Editorial, 37 CML Rev.
(2001), 733–737.
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2. Factual and procedural background
The facts of the case are as follows. Soledad Duarte Hueros (hereinafter: “the
buyer”) bought a Citroën car with a sliding roof from Autociba. The vehicle
had to be returned and was repaired multiple times by Autociba, because
water leaked into the car when it rained. However, the attempts to repair the car
were unsuccessful. The buyer requested that the car be replaced, butAutociba
refused to do so. Finally, the buyer claimed for rescission of the contract and
asked Autociba and the manufacturer of the car (Automóviles Citroën España
SA) to repay the purchase price.
The Spanish Court of First Instance of Badajoz held that the ordered
rescission of the contract could not be granted under Article 3(5) of the CSD
since the lack of conformity was only “minor”. Consequently, the buyer was
merely entitled to invoke a price reduction under Article 3(6) of the CSD.
Nevertheless, the judge indicated that he could not apply price reduction
because the buyer had only claimed rescission and not price reduction. Indeed,
Spanish procedural rules provide that “judicial decisions must be
commensurate with the requests made by the parties” (Art. 218 of the Code of
Civil Procedure). Furthermore, because the buyer had already had the
possibility to claim a price reduction by way of an alternative claim, which she
did not do, such application would be inadmissible in further proceedings
because of the res judicata principle. In Spanish law this principle extends to
all the claims which the applicant could have made in earlier procedures.3
Nevertheless, the Spanish court doubted whether or not these strict
procedural rules were in conformity with European law and asked the ECJ the
following question for a preliminary ruling: “If a consumer, after failing to
have the product brought into conformity – because, despite repeated
requests, repair has not been carried out – seeks in legal proceedings only
rescission of the contract, and such rescission is not available because the lack
of conformity is minor, may the court of its ownmotion grant the consumer an
appropriate price reduction?”
3. Opinion of theAdvocate General
Advocate General Kokott reformulated the question and examined whether
the CSDmeans that a national court must be able to grant a price reduction of
its own motion where the consumer has not claimed for it in the procedure but
3. See in this review Kornezov, “Res judicata of national judgments incompatible with EU
law: Time for a major rethink?”, 809–842.
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is entitled to it under the CSD. Moreover, she stressed that it is important to
assess whether a national courtmust grant of its ownmotion a price reduction.
The Advocate General started by indicating that the CSD does not provide
rules on the enforcement of consumers’ remedies in legal proceedings.4 She
cited the settled case law of the ECJ which states that if there is no EU law
concerning the matter, every EU Member State may lay down its internal
procedural rules which must, of course, respect the principles of equivalence
and effectiveness.5 The further reasoning of the Advocate General was
twofold. She first examined whether the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness were respected by the Spanish legislation. It was clear that the
former principle had not been breached, since the Spanish procedural rules do
not distinguish between actions under internal and Union law; however, the
principle of effectiveness was breached as Spanish procedural law makes it
extremely difficult to assert the rights under the CSD.6 A single procedural
error (the submission of an incorrect application or the omission to apply for
the alternative) will mean that the consumer cannot rely on one of the rights of
the CSD.7 Consequently, the consumer always has to submit all possible
claims (in the alternative) otherwise he risks losing one of his rights.
Secondly, theAdvocate General examined the consequences of a breach of
the principle of effectiveness. She first indicated that the national court should
try to interpret national procedural rules in such a way as to enable the
consumer to effectively exercise his rights.8 However, the procedural
autonomy ofMember States must be taken into account as well as the fact that
the principle that parties determine themselves the subject matter of
proceedings is a basic principle of Member States.9 Moreover, the ECJ’s case
law on unfair terms (which relates to the conclusion of a contract) may not be
transposed to the CSD (which relates to the implementation of a contract
already concluded), whilst the consumer is not in a comparably weak position
in the latter situation.10 Consequently, the Advocate General opined that the
principle of effectiveness does not oblige national courts to grant a price
reduction of its ownmotion. It is sufficient that national procedural law can be
“interpreted and applied in such a manner that it makes available to the
consumer an instrument allowing him to assert his rights himself ” (such as to
amend the application, at the instruction of the judge).11 Another option is to
4. Opinion, para 25.
5. Opinion, para 26.
6. Opinion, paras. 28–36.
7. Opinion, para 33.
8. Opinion, paras. 37–38.
9. Opinion, paras. 39–40.
10. Opinion, paras. 42–48.
11. Opinion, para 49.
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interpret national procedural rules to the effect that a price reduction is
included in the application for rescission.12 A last possibility is to interpret the
national principle of res judicata so that it is understood in the same way (as
broadly or as narrowly) as the principle of congruency or the specific
application.13 As a last resort the national court can grant price reduction of its
own motion.14 The Directive, of course, does not preclude a national court
from granting a price reduction of its own motion if national procedural law
provides for it. Nonetheless, the national court may never apply a measure
against the applicant’s will (the court has to assess the precise will of the
party) andmust always respect the rights of defence of the opposing party.15 In
sum, the Advocate General was of the opinion that the national court is not
obliged to grant a price reduction of its ownmotion. Nevertheless, the national
court must preserve the consumer’s rights by taking appropriate measures
when he invokes an incorrect remedy and cannot exercise his rights under the
Consumer Rights Directive by other means.
4. Judgment of the Court
The ECJ adopted a large part of the reasoning of the Advocate General.
However, the ECJ seemed to take it somewhat further. Firstly, the ECJ noted
that the CSD aims to ensure a high level of consumer protection; thereafter, it
recalled the remedial system of the Directive (see also section 5.3 below).16
Further, the ECJ pointed to the fact that Article 3 of the CSD does not oblige
a national court to grant a price reduction of its own motion.17 However, the
Directive requires that consumers must be able to exercise their rights
effectively.18 The Court indicated, thereby reiterating the Advocate General’s
view, that the Directive does not provide rules on the enforcement of the
consumers’ remedies in legal proceedings.19 The ECJ noted that Member
States are allowed to lay down their internal procedural rules (principle of
procedural autonomy) which must, of course, respect the principles of
12. The question is, however, not whether under substantive law a claim for reduction is
included in a claim for rescission: Opinion, para 50.
13. Opinion, para 51. See also Kornezov, op. cit. supra note 3.
14. Opinion, para 52.
15. Opinion, para 53.
16. Judgment, paras. 25–28.
17. Judgment, para 29.
18. Judgment, para 30.
19. Judgment, para 30. Opinion, para 25.
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equivalence and effectiveness.20 The Court confirmed that, having regard to
those two principles, problems will only arise concerning the principle of
effectiveness.21 The ECJ also came to the conclusion that the Spanish
procedural rules undermine the effectiveness of the consumer protection
under the CSD.
The application of the Spanish procedural rules – in which a consumer can
neither vary its original submission nor bring a fresh action – which do not
allow courts to grant price reduction of their own motion makes it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to give the consumer the appropriate protection
which the CSD seeks to provide.22 The Spanish system, consequentially,
obliges consumers to predict the decision of the court, which undermines
consumer protection.
The fact that the principle of effectiveness is breached did not imply that a
national court is obliged to grant price reduction of its own motion. It suffices
that national procedural law can be interpreted in order to enable the consumer
to exercise his rights under the CSD. The ECJ took this further by deciding
that, under the given circumstances, a court must be able to invoke price
reduction of its own motion. The Court ruled that:
“Directive 1999/44/EC . . . must be interpreted as precluding legislation
of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which
does not allow the national court hearing the dispute to grant of its own
motion an appropriate reduction in the price of goods which are the
subject of a contract of sale in the case where a consumer who is entitled
to such a reduction brings proceedings which are limited to seeking only
rescission of that contract and such rescission cannot be granted because
the lack of conformity in those goods is minor, even though that consumer
is not entitled to refine his initial application or to bring a fresh action to
that end.”23
5. Comment
Duarte Hueros is not an isolated judgment of the ECJ. It can be fitted in its
jurisprudence about the role of national judges. The annotated case deals with
the possibility of national courts to apply ex officio EU law or national
provisions implementing EU directives. This case law has developed mainly
20. Judgment, para 31.
21. Judgment, paras. 32–41.
22. Judgment, paras. 39–41.
23. Emphasis added.
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in the fields of competition,24 administrative,25 and consumer protection law.
Duarte Hueros is situated in the area of consumer protection and implies yet
another pioneering step.
5.1. Procedural autonomy
The ECJ and the Advocate General both stress that the CSD does not contain
any procedural rules obliging a national court to grant the buyer a price
reduction of its own motion in the given circumstances. Consequently, the
procedural rules fall within the internal legal order of the Member States, and
are subject to the principle of procedural autonomy, dealt with in case law
since Rewe and Comet.26 Rewe linked, moreover, national procedural
autonomy to the principle of sincere cooperation between the Union and the
Member States (Art. 4 TEU).27 Procedural autonomy is restricted by the
principle of equivalence (national procedural rules may not be less favourable
for EU matters in comparison to internal matters) and the principle of
effectiveness (national procedural rules may not make it in practice impossible
or excessively difficult to apply EU law). The “equivalence” test will not be
extensively discussed here the since the Court and the Advocate General did
not find in the annotated case a difference in treatment of a claim based on EU
law or under Spanish law. Nevertheless, questions could arise about the
“public policy” character of the CSD provisions.28 Must a judge apply ex
officio the protection of the remedial system of the Directive if parties deviate
from it to the detriment of the consumer?29,30
24. See e.g. Joined Cases C-430 & 431/93, Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas
Cornelis van Veen v. Stichting pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, [1995] ECR I-4705.
25. See e.g. Joined Cases C-222–225/05, J. van der Weerd and Others v. Minister van
Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, [2007] I-4233.
26. Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer
für das Saarland, [1976] ECR, 1989; Case 45/76, Comet BV v. Produktschap voor
Siergewassen, [1976] ECR, 2043.
27. See Rewe, ibid., para 5.
28. See also Graf andAppleton, case note onMostaza Claro, (2007) ASA Bulletin, 59. See
extensively about the development of “public policy” in EU law Ebers, “ECJ (First Chamber) 6
Oct. 2009, Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira”,
(2010) E.R.P.L., 839–846. See, for a very critical about the concept “public policy”, Stuyck, op.
cit. supra note 2, 731–732; Stuyck, case note on Pannon and Asturcom, 47 CML Rev. (2010),
891–892.
29. This is, of course, only the case if national law obliges the judge to raise of its own
motion internal rules of public policy.
30. Especially taking into account the mandatory nature of Art. 7 of the CSD (note the
similar wordings in comparison to Art. 6 Unfair Terms Directive) and the dual aim of the
Directive to ensure a high level of consumer protection and the creation of an internal market
where consumers should be free to purchase goods in the EU.
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In addition to the restrictions by the equivalence and effectiveness
principles one must also take into account the general principle of effective
judicial protection, a principle which was nevertheless not mentioned by the
ECJ in the present judgment.31 Obviously this general principle is closely
connected to the restrictions of procedural autonomy by the requirements of
equivalence and effectiveness.
5.2. Effectiveness and the national Courts’ power to raise or to apply
pleas derived from EU law of its own motion
The principle of effectiveness is amply examined while analysing the national
procedural rule prohibiting the court to grant of its own motion a price
reduction. National procedural rules may not make it virtually impossible or
excessively difficult “to exercise the rights conferred by EU law” or “to apply
EU law”.32,33 This test was refined in Van Schijndel and Peterbroeck, while
analysing the question whether a national court could raise of its own motion
pleas derived from EU law.34 Two elements are to be considered:35 a
31. See for the principle of effective judicial protection Art. 6 and 13 ECHR,Art. 19(1)TEU
and Art. 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Also on the link between “effective
judicial protection” and “procedural autonomy”,Trstenjak andBeysen, op. cit. supra note 2, 98;
Van Dam and Van Eijsden, “Ex officio application of EC law by national courts of law in tax
cases, discretionary authority or an obligation?”, (2009) EC Tax Rev., 17.
32. Rewe and Comet (cited supra note 26) only refer for the principle of effectiveness to the
aspect that national procedural law may not make it “impossible in practice” to exercise the EU
rights. The ECJ raised for the first time in San Giorgio the threshold of the effectiveness
principle by stating (after mentioning the test of Rewe and Comet in para 12: “virtually
impossible”) in para 14: “virtually impossible or excessively difficult”: Case 199/82,
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SpA San Giorgio, [1983] ECR, 3595. See also
about this development: Trstenjak and Beysen, op. cit. supra note 2, 101–102.
33. The ECJ uses the latter formulation (“to apply EU law”) in the present case. For a theory
differentiating between the two formulations as being “subjective” (protection interest of an
individual or a group) and “objective” (protection wider common interest), see Schebesta,
“Does the national court know European law?A note on ex officio application after Asturcom”,
(2010) E.R.P.L., 857–858.
34. Van Schijndel, cited supra note 24, para 19 (taking into account the dispositive principle;
passive role of the judge). Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout and Cie SCS v.
Belgian State, [1995] ECR I-4599, para 14 (time limits). See also for an overview of the
development of the effectiveness principle Tridimas, TheGeneral Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed.
(OUP, 2006), pp. 418 et seq.
35. See about these two elements Schebesta, op. cit. supra note 33, 858; Prechal,
“Community law in national courts: The lesson from Van Schijndel”, 35 CML Rev. (1998),
690–692 (somewhat less clear about the two elements but quite critical about the practicability
of the test, however, designates it as a “useful model”). Also using the term “balancing of
interest”, see Trstenjak and Beysen, op. cit. supra note 2, 103. This test is also called “the
procedural rule of reason”: Claes, The national Courts’Mandate in the European Constitution
(Hart, 2006), p. 123; Lauwaars, “The application of community law by national courts ex
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context-related element and a balancing-element. National procedural rules
must be analysed (1) “by reference to the role of that provision in the
procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the
various national instances” (context) and taking into account, where
appropriate, (2) “the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as
the protection of the rights of defence, the principle of legal certainty and the
proper conduct of procedure” (balancing). This means that well-founded
national procedural rules can justify restrictions on the application of EU
law.36 Essentially, it is a question of proportionality and of mutual
cooperation.37 This context/balancing-test is often applied by the ECJ either
explicitly38 or implicitly39.
Nevertheless, this test was not regularly applied to EU consumer law cases
concerning the question whether national courts can/must apply pleas derived
from EU law of their own motion.40 Indeed, many cases did not refer to this
test.41 Consequently, consumer law was seen as a category “beyond balancing
officio”, (2007) Fordham International Law Journal, 1163; Pavillon, case note on Mostaza
Claro – “The unfair Contract Terms Directive: The ECJ’s Third Intervention in Domestic
Procedural Law”, (2007) E.R.P.L., 742; Prechal, op. cit. supra note 35, 691.
36. See in detail Schebesta, op. cit. supra note 33, 858.
37. OpinionA.G. Jacobs of 15 Jun. 1995 under Van Schijndel, cited supra note 24, para 27
(refers to the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity).Trstenjak andBeysen, op. cit. supra
note 2, 103. Cf. also Heukels, case note on Van Schijndel and Peterbroeck”, 33 CML Rev.
(1996), 349; Prechal, op. cit. supra note 35, 705. The following authors argue in a detailed
article about the approach of the ECJ towards consumer protection that the consumer directives
have to be reconsidered in the light of proportionality: Unberath and Johnston, “The
double-headed approach of the ECJ concerning consumer protection”, 44 CML Rev. (2007),
1284.
38. See explicitly for the same test as in Van Schijndel and Peterbroeck: J. van der Weerd
and Others, cited supra note 25, para 33 (administrative law).
39. The test is not explicitly mentioned in the same wording; however, national procedural
law is taken into account: Case C-455/06, Heemskerck and Firma Schaap v. ProductschapVee
en Vlees, [2008] I-8763, paras. 45 et seq. (the ECJ takes into account the national procedural
rule of the prohibition of reformatio in pejus).
40. See in detail VanDam and VanEijsden, op. cit. supra note 31, 19–20; Schebesta, op. cit.
supra note 33, 860 et seq. See also Pavillon, op. cit. supra note 35, 743; Van Huffel, “La
condition procédurale des règles de protection des consommateurs: les enseignements des
arrêtsOcéano,Heiniger et Cofidis de la Cour de justice”, (2003) Revue européenne de droit de
la consommation, 102–103.
41. Joined Cases C-240-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial SA v. Roció Murciano Quintero
and Salvat Editoris SA v. José M. Sánchez Alcóon Prades, José Luis Copano Badillo,
Mohammed Berroane and Emilio Viñas Feliú, [2000] ECR I-4941; Case C-168/05, Case
C-429/05,Max Rampion and Marie-Jeanno Godard, née Godard v. Franfinance SA and K par
K SAS, [2007] ECR I-8017 (Van Schijndel case mentioned by the French Government in para
67, nevertheless, no analysis by the ECJ); Case C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ferenc
Schneider, [2010] I-10847; Case C-488/11, Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse, Katarina de Man
Garabito v. Jahani BV, judgment of 30 May 2013, nyr.
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or equivalence”.42 Those cases mostly refer to consumer protection and the
need for positive action by national courts to correct the “imbalance” between
consumers and undertakings. As for cases relating to the Unfair Terms
Directive43 the ECJ invokes Article 6(1), according to which unfair terms are
not binding upon the consumer.This provision has, according to the Court, the
aim to re-establish the balance between the rights and obligations of the
parties. The rationale of this provision (consumer protection) often seems to
replace the context/balance-test with regard to effectiveness.44 Also the
Rampion case, concerning the Consumer Credit Directive,45 does not refer to
the context/balance-test. The ECJ states that the arguments applied in the
unfair terms cases are equally valid for Article 11(2) of the Consumer Credit
Directive. Here too, the rationale of consumer protection seems to be used to
concretize the effectiveness principle. Consequently, the Court raises the
threshold of the effectiveness principle taking into account the rationale of the
provisions in consumer directives.46
Nevertheless, more recently in Martín Martín, concerning the Doorstep
SellingDirective,47 the ECJ implicitly refers to the context/balancing-test.48 In
this case, the Court does not refer to the literal wording of the test, but refers
to national rules limiting the power of a national court to act of its ownmotion
which are justified by the national principle that it is for the parties to take the
initiative (the so-called “dispositive principle”).Also some unfair terms cases
42. Corthaut, EU Ordre public (Kluwer Law International, 2012), II-174 – II-175;
Schebesta, op. cit. supra note 33, 86; Van Dam and Van Eijsden, op. cit. supra note 31, 20.
43. Directive 1993/13/EEC of the Council of 5 Apr. 1993 on unfair terms in consumer
contracts, O.J. 1993, L 095/29–34 (hereinafter: Unfair Terms Directive).
44. For the same reasoning, see Van Dam and Van Eijsden, op. cit. supra note 31, 20;
Schebesta, op. cit. supra note 33, 860.
45. Directive 87/102/EEC of the Council of 22Dec. 1986 for the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit,
O.J. 1987, L 042/48–53. This directive has been repealed by Directive 2008/48/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 Apr. 2008 on credit agreements for consumers
and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, O.J. 2008, L 133/66. See Rampion, cited supra
note 41, paras. 61–65.
46. For the same opinion, see Trstenjak and Beysen, op. cit. supra note 2, 121.
47. Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 Dec. 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts
negotiated away from business premises, O.J. 1985, L 372/31–33. The Directive on consumer
Rights will replace as from 13 Jun. 2014, inter alia the current Directive 85/577/EEC (Directive
2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25Oct. 2011 on consumer rights,
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance, O.J. 2011, L 304/64–88).
48. SeeCaseC-227/08,EvaMartínMartín v.EDPEditores SL, [2009] ECR I-11939, paras.
19–20.
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explicitly49 or implicitly50 refer to (a part of) the context/balancing-test,
although they also refer to the consumer protection aim.
It is important for the ECJ, by applying the effectiveness test, to take into
account the procedural context of the national provisions and to balance the
interests of national procedural law and EU law.51This approachwill assist the
Court to maintain the equilibrium between the national and the EU legal order
and to take into account national sensitivities and national procedural
complexity. Consequently, it is to be welcomed that the ECJ refers implicitly
or explicitly to the context/balancing-test.
Which approach towards effectiveness has been followed in the Duarte
Hueros case?
The ECJmainly focuses on the context of the national procedural law which
excludes the national court from granting of its own motion the right to the
consumer to obtain a price reduction, by reiterating the context part of the Van
Schijndel context/balancing-test.52 Furthermore, the Court fully examines the
context in which a national court is unable to grant of its own motion a price
reduction. Two elements of Spanish procedural law are emphasized. Firstly, a
national court cannot refine the consumer’s initial application during the
proceedings.53 Furthermore, the applicant cannot bring a “fresh action” in
another procedure due to the res judicata principle as it is developed in
49. Explicitly, Case C-473/00,Cofidis SA v. Jean-Louis Fredout, [2002] ECR I-10875, para
37 (only the context-part of the test is mentioned; there is no real assessment); Case C-40/08,
AsturcomTelecommunicaciones SL v.Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira, [2009] ECR I-9579, paras.
35–48 (para 39 includes the entire Van Schijndel and Peterbroecks test; extensive developments
about the national res judicata principle and procedural rules about time limits for bringing
proceedings); C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, judgment
of 14 June 2012, nyr, paras. 49–55 (only the context-part of the test is mentioned; assessment of
the specific procedural context); Case C-397/11,Erika Jo″rös v.AegonMagyarországHitel Zrt.,
judgment of 30 May 2013, nyr, para 32 (only the context-part of the test is mentioned).
50. Implicitly, Case C-168/05, Elisa María Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL,
[2006] ECR I-10421, paras. 33–34 (the importance of the efficiency of national arbitral
procedures is discussed); Case C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Gyo″rfi, [2009]
ECR I-4713, para 34 (considerations of national procedural law cannot constitute a factorwhich
can affect the legal protection of the Directive); Case C-76/10, Pohotovost’ s.r.o. v. Iveta
Korcˇkovská, [2010] ECR I-11557, paras. 45–46 (stressing the res judicata principle and time
limits for bringing proceedings).
51. See also in favour of the Van Schijndel test to limit the requirement of effectiveness,
Bobek, “Why is there no principle of “procedural Autonomy” of the Member States”, (2011)
<ssrn.com>, 7. Conclusion.
52. Judgment, para 34. The ECJ also refers solely to the first part of the
context/balancing-approach, namely the context-approach, with regard to the effectiveness
principle in the following cases (about unfair terms), Cofidis, cited supra note 49, para 37;
Banco Español de Crédito, cited supra note 49, para 49; Erika Jo″rös, cited supra note 49,
para 32.
53. Judgment, para 35.
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Spanish law.54 This means that a consumer is virtually deprived of asking for
a price reduction. The consumer can only preserve his rights by introducing,
from the beginning, two alternative claims: one seeking for rescission and the
other seeking for price reduction in the case where non-conformity is
considered to beminor.Moreover, the Court rightly states that a consumerwill
not easily ask for “inferior relief ” in its initial application, because he is
unaware of his rights.55 Besides, a consumer might be dissuaded to invoke
price reduction as an alternative claim in his initial application because of the
risk of weakening his arguments by asking for “inferior” relief. The ECJ also
invokes the narrower “consumer protection” approach with regard to the
effectiveness principle. However, it is only mentioned so as to conclude that
the Spanish procedural rules will undermine the effectiveness of consumer
protection, in the given circumstances.56
We can infer from the Court’s reasoning that it bases its examination of
the effectiveness principle in Duarte Hueros mainly on the “context-part” of
theVan Schijndel case.The typical “consumer protection rationale” is invoked
to reinforce the conclusion that the Spanish system makes the enforcement of
the protection offered by the CSD “excessively difficult if not impossible”.
This approach rightly takes into account the context of the national procedural
rules and balances it with the rationale of the Directive, thereby respecting the
exigencies of national procedural autonomy and national sensitivities.57
5.3. An obligation for national courts to apply price reduction of its own
motion?
The first ECJ cases ruling upon the power of the national courts to raise or to
apply EU law or national provisions implementing EU directives ex officio
were not clear about the question of whether these courts had only a
discretionary power or had an obligation to do it.58 This was also the case for
the consumer law cases.59 In Océano the ECJ made it clear for the first time
54. Judgment, para 36.
55. See Judgment, para 38 and Opinion, para 36.
56. Judgment, para 39.
57. See also Schebesta, op. cit. supra note 33, 861 (this author thinks that the case law will
develop toward a “point of stabilization”; consumer law cases are thereby streamlined with the
(often) administrative body of law which respects procedural autonomy”).
58. See e.g. Peterbroeck, cited supra note 34, para 21 (“EC law precludes application of a
domestic procedural rule whose effect, in procedural circumstances such as those in question in
the main proceedings, is to prevent the national court, seized of a matter falling within its
jurisdiction, from considering of its own motion”) (our emphases).
59. See e.g. Océano Grupo, cited supra note 41 (operative part 1: “the protection provided
for consumers in Directive 93/13 entails the national court being able to determine of its own
motionwhether a term of a contract before it is unfairwhenmaking its preliminary assessments
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that, in order to guarantee consumer protection, a national court has the power
to determine of its own motion whether a term is considered unfair.60 In
Cofidis the ECJ clarified that this is not limited to jurisdiction clauses with
respect to the admissibility of the claim, as was the case inOcéano, but can be
applied to all unfair terms in all stages of the procedure.61 In Rampion the
Court made clear that this is not restricted to the Unfair Terms Directive but is
also applicable the Consumer Credit Directive.62 Later,MartínMartín showed
that this was also the case for the Doorstep Selling Directive.63 Furthermore,
the annotated Duarte Hueros case involved the CSD.64 However, in the
meantime, Pannon ended the discussion whether the judge has not only the
power but also an obligation to enforce consumer’s rights of its own motion
with regard to unfair terms. The ECJ ruled that a national court is obliged to
examine of its ownmotion the unfairness of a contractual termwhen it has all
the factual and legal elements needed at its disposal.65 This was confirmed by
as towhether a claim should be allowed to proceed before national courts”);Cofidis, cited supra
note 49, para 38 (“precludes a national provision which, in proceedings brought by a seller or
supplier against a consumer on the basis of a contract concluded between them, prohibits the
national court, on expiry of a limitation period, from finding, of its own motion or following a
plea raised by the consumer, that a term of the contract is unfair”); Rampion, cited supra note
41, para 69 (“The Directive is to be interpreted as allowing national courts to apply of their own
motion the provision transposing Article 11(2) thereof into national law”) (our emphases).
60. See Océano Grupo, cited supra note 41.
61. See Cofidis, cited supra note 49 (this case was about a clause in a credit agreement
which was found unfair because it was not legible and misleading). For this opinion before the
Cofidis case, see Stijns, “Zijn onrechtmatige bedingen nietig?” in Liber Amicorum: Yvette
Merchiers (die Keure, 2001), p. 941. For a cautious view beforeCofidis, and supporting the idea
– afterOcéano Grupo – that the ruling of the ECJ is limited to jurisdiction clauseswith respect
to the admissibility of the claim: Stuyck, op. cit. supra note 2, 732. On the evolution, see
Goddaer et al., “Invloed van het Europese recht op het consumenten(contracten)recht” in
Samoy, et al. (Eds.), Invloed van het Europese recht op het Belgische privaatrecht (Intersentia,
2012), pp. 537–538.
62. Rampion, cited supra note 41, para 69. See also Trstenjak, “Procedural aspects of
European consumer Protection law and the case law of the CJEU”, (2013) E.R.P.L., 465–466.
63. See Martín Martín, cited supra note 48.
64. For comments predicting that the Court would extend its case law about the ex officio
powers of the judge also to consumer sales, see Krans, Nederlands Burgerlijk Procesrecht en
Materieel EU-recht (Kluwer, 2010), pp. 36–37.
65. See Pannon, cited supra note 50, para 35 (“The reply, therefore, to the second question
is that the national court is required to examine, of its own motion, the unfairness of a
contractual term where it has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that
task. Where it considers such a term to be unfair, it must not apply it, except if the consumer
opposes that non-application. That duty is also incumbent on the national court when it is
ascertaining its own territorial jurisdiction”) (our emphases). For a confirmation in the
following cases, see Asturcom, cited supra note 49; Pohotovost’, cited supra note 50; Asbeek
Brusse, cited supra note 41; Erika Jo″rös, cited supra note 49. One author seems to hold that the
Mostaza Claro case already confirmed the view that a national court is obliged to examine of its
own motion the unfairness of a contractual term (Ebers, op. cit. supra note 28, 830). This point
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other cases concerning the Unfair Terms Directive.66 As for the other
consumer directives it is clear that the national court has the power to apply of
its ownmotion the rights that consumers derive from the directive but it is still
unclear whether the court has an obligation.67 Nevertheless, some authors are
of the opinion that an ex officio obligation is also applicable under the
Doorstep Selling Directive68 or for all consumer protection directives.69
Duarte Hueros is the third consumer law case to address the power of the
courts to apply rights derived from EU legislation outside the scope of the
Unfair Terms Directive.70 The ECJ is not very clear about a possible “duty” to
apply those rights of its own motion. However, it decides that the CSD
precludes national rules, which do not allow a national court hearing the
dispute to grant of its own motion an appropriate price reduction, under the
given circumstances. The Advocate General concludes that national courts
are not under the obligation to grant a price reduction of their own motion.71
Furthermore, she points out that the case law under the UnfairTermsDirective
cannot be transposed to Duarte Hueros. She reasons that the latter Directive
aims to compensate for the consumers’ inferior position when concluding a
contract and that this situation is very different from the implementation of a
of view is not correct because the ECJ did not assess in that case the question whether a national
court can examine the unfair term of its own motion, but rather whether a court must annul an
arbitration award, when the arbitration agreement contains an unfair term, and the issue was not
raised by the consumer in the arbitration proceedings but only in that of the action for
annulment.
66. Asturcom, cited supra note 49, para 59; Pénzügyi, cited supra note 41, para 49;
Pohotovost’, cited supra note 50, para 54; Asbeek Brusse, cited supra note 41, para 53; Erika
Jo″rös, cited supra note 49, para 38. See also Trstenjak and Beysen, op. cit. supra note 2,
119–120.
67. Rampion (cited supra note 41) concerning the Consumer Credit Directive appeared
before the Pannon case. The ECJ only states inMartín Martín (cited supra note 48) concerning
the Doorstep Selling Directive in para 29: “in those circumstances, it must be held that, in the
event that the consumer has not been duly informed of her right of cancellation, the national
court seized may raise, of its own motion, an infringement of the requirements laid down in
Article 4 of the Directive” (our emphasis).
68. Ebers, op. cit. supra note 28, 833.
69. For the last opinion, see Stijns and Swaenepoel, “Evolutiepolen van de onrechtmatige
bedingenleer”, (2013) DCCR No. 26. Van Oevelen, et al., “Ambtshalve inroepbaarheid van
Europees consumentenrecht, materieelrechtelijk en procesrechtelijk beschouwd” in
Straetmans and Rozie (Eds.), Doorwerking van het Europese recht in de nationale rechterlijke
praktijk (Intersentia, 2012), pp. 103–104.
70. The cases concerning the Unfair Terms Directive address the question whether a judge
has the power / the obligation to determine of its own motion the unfairness of a term.
71. Opinion, paras. 41–42 et seq.
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consumer contract targeted by the CSD in Duarte Hueros.72 Whereas the
positive action of a national court to examine the unfairness of a term can be
a deterrent for undertakings to use unfair terms, this would be – according to
the Advocate General – irrelevant for the implementation of a contract.
Moreover, she stresses that consumers need more protection if an undertaking
claims against a consumer relying on an unfair term. According to her,
consumers are in a stronger position when invoking remedies under the CSD
against an undertaking; action by a national court of its own motion would
mean “an additional means of attack”.
The opinion of theAdvocate General has the merit of expressly comparing
the aims of the Unfair Terms Directive and the CSD.73 She comes to the
conclusion that the two directives have different aims, allowing more
far-reaching powers of the national judge in case of theUnfairTermsDirective
in comparison to the CSD. However, some other elements need to be stressed.
A first element is the goal of the CSD. The first recital of the preamble of the
CSD makes clear that “a high level of consumer protection” is, next to the
creation of an internal market, the ultimate aim of the Directive. This has been
confirmed in previous case law of the ECJ74 and in theDuarte Hueros case.75
Besides, the argument of the Advocate General that an action by a national
court of its own motion would provide the consumer with an extra “means of
attack” has to be nuanced. It is true that the consumer sales remedies will often
be used as a “claim” when the consumer has discovered non-conformity.76
However, if the consumer has not yet paid the (full) price and the seller claims
the full price, the consumer can ask for rescission or price reduction as a
“defence” (if the hierarchy of remedies is respected) because of a
non-conformity. Consequently, it is possible that the seller claims the full price
for non-conforming goods and that the consumer omits to raise its right to
reduce the price and invokes the wrong remedy, such as rescission. In this
situation, the court could (depending on the national system) instruct the
consumer to choose such a remedy or even grant this remedy of its ownmotion
(e.g. in case of default of appearance or if the system does not allow to refine
72. Indicating that especially the weak position of the consumer is decisive with regard to
the question whether the national court has the power apply ex officio national legislation
implementing a consumer directive, seeAncery,AmbtshalveToepassing van EU-recht (Kluwer,
2012), p. 123.
73. Opinion, para 43.
74. Quelle, cited supra note 1, para 36; Weber, cited supra note 1, para 55.
75. Judgment, paras. 25 and 41.
76. Cf. also the Rampion, cited supra note 41 (in this case, concerning the Consumer Credit
Directive, the consumer initiated the proceedings by taking his claim to a court). On this aspect
with regard to the Rampion case, see also Ebers, op. cit. supra note 28, 832. On lack of
differentiation between the consumer claiming for something or defending himself, Van
Oevelen, et al., op. cit. supra note 69, 103.
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the initial application and does not allow to make a fresh action to that end),
without providing the consumer with an “extra means of attack”.
Another element is the “weak or inferior position” of the consumer. The
position of the consumer is potentially weakened becauseArticle 3 CSD gives
the consumer the right to choose between the remedies. How can a “right to
choose” weaken the consumer’s position? This can be explained by the
hierarchy of remedies, which the consumer has to respect. This means that he
can choose a remedy to which he is not entitled. To gain a better insight, I
should briefly reiterate the hierarchy of remedies under the CSD. In the first
instance the consumer can only choose either repair or replacement, unless
the remedy chosen is impossible or disproportionate (“primary” remedies).
Only if the primary remedy is disproportionate in comparison to the other
primary remedy is the consumer not allowed to choose it.77 Furthermore,
repair or replacement has to be completed by the seller within a reasonable
time frame andwithout any significant inconvenience to the consumer. Only in
second instance can the consumer choose price reduction or rescission
(“secondary” or “subsidiary” remedies). These remedies can only be invoked
if the consumer is not entitled to either repair or replacement (in case both of
them are impossible) or if the seller has not completed the repair or the
replacement within a reasonable time frame or without significant
inconvenience to the consumer. Rescission of the contract has been restricted
even further because it cannot be invoked if the lack of conformity is minor.
This restriction does not apply to price reduction.
In Duarto Hueros, the consumer has initially respected the hierarchy of
remedies by first trying to get the car repaired and, after a number of
77. It must be noted that this proportionality test cannot be applied when contemplating the
applicability of either a primary or a secondary remedy (i.e. price reduction or termination).
Consequently, the consumer cannot be required to accept a “secondary” remedy due to the
proportionality test. Indeed, according to Teneiro and Gomez, the proportionality test is only
applicable between the primary remedies and not between the primary and the secondary
remedies: Teneiro and Gomez, “La directive 1999/44/CE sur certains aspects de la vente et des
garanties des biens de consommation”, (2000) REDC, 23. For this point of view in Germany
before Weber, see Leible, “Kaufvertrag (§§ 433 bis 480 BGB)” in Gebauer and Wiedmann
(Eds.), Zivilrecht unter europäischem Einfluss (Boorberg, 2010), pp. 453–454. See also contra
about the Directive, Gärtner,Die Umsetzung der Verbrauchsgüterkaufrichtlinie in Deutschland
und Grossbritannien (Peter Lang, 2006), p. 81 (“Vielmehr wäre es schikanös den Verkäufer an
der einzig möglichen Art der Nacherfüllung festzuhalten, wenn sie außergewöhnlich hohe
Kosten verursacht. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind Art. 3 Abs. 3 S. 1, 2 RL dahingehend zu
interpretieren, dass die gewählte Abhilfe ausnahmsweise auch dann unverhältnismäßig sein
kann, wenn keineAlternative besteht”). This question is also extensively dealt with in Bradgate
and Twigg-Flesner, Consumer Sales and Associated Guarantee (OUP, 2003), pp. 92–94
(accepts in the end that the proportionality test only applies to the primary remedies).The ECJ
confirmed the point of view of Teneiro and Gomez in a preliminary ruling of 16 Jun. 2011, see
Weber, cited supra note 1.
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unsuccessful attempts, to ask for the replacement of the car. Nevertheless, the
seller refused to replace the car. The buyer ran out of patience and brought an
action for rescission. It is clear from the facts, as extracted from theAdvocate
General’s Opinion,78 that an expert opinion did not consider the defect to be
minor. Nonetheless, the national court decides that the defect is minor and
therefore the claim for rescission cannot be granted. This shows, as the ECJ
rightly states,79 the complexity of the analysis for the consumer by making his
choice for a remedy respecting the hierarchy of remedies required by the
Directive. Moreover, a consumer has neither the technical baggage nor the
knowledge to determine whether a defect is minor, or whether repair or
replacement can be performed by the seller without serious inconvenience.
Consequently, the consumer who has the right to choose a remedy, but has, at
the same time, to respect a hierarchy of remedies, must be protected when he
has chosen the wrong remedy. He can for example be protected by allowing a
national court to instruct the consumer on the relevant remedies. However, in
the present circumstances, where the consumer is not allowed to refine its
initial application and is not allowed to make a fresh action to invoke the
primary remedies, and if he has chosen the wrong remedy, he has to be
considered being in a comparably weak position to consumers in unfair
term-cases.
In conclusion, it must be stressed that, although there might be some
differences in the exact motivation why consumers need to be protected under
the Unfair Terms Directive and the CSD, in the end, both Directives aim for
strong and effective consumer protection. This is why the ECJ should not
differentiate between the two Directives when assessing the concrete
procedural rules of a legal system. Consequently, in line with the unfair terms
case law, a national court should be required to grant of its own motion the
alternative remedy of price reduction, when a consumer has incorrectly
invoked rescission (because the non-conformity is only minor) and is only
entitled to price reduction and the national system makes it impossible or
excessively difficult to invoke this alternative remedy (e.g. a national system
does not allow refining the initial application and does not allow making a
fresh action to that end), provided that all the legal and factual elements
necessary are available. This approach might seem far-reaching but is
moderated by the tendency of the ECJ to take into account the national context
and the balancing of interests between national procedural rules and EU law
when assessing the effectiveness test (supra, 5.2).
78. See Opinion, para 36.
79. See Judgment, para 40.
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6. Concluding remarks
The ECJ confirms its consumer-friendly approach in this third case in which
it addresses the CSD. Nevertheless, the Court should be consistent and apply
its reasoning concerning unfair term cases by imposing a national judge to
grant permitted remedies in case a consumer has invoked the wrong remedy in
circumstances which exclude the effectiveness of EU law. These
circumstances must, of course, be assessed taking into account the national
context and be balanced with EU requirements.
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